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Abstract. Most, if not all, conferences use an online system to handle
paper submissions and reviews. Introduction of these systems has sig-
nificantly facilitated the administration, submission and review process
compared to traditional paper-based ones. However, it is crucial that
these systems have strong resistance against Web attacks as they in-
volve confidential data and privacy. Some submissions could be leading
edge breakthroughs that authors do not wish to leak out and be sub-
tly plagiarized. Also, security of the employed system will attract more
submissions to conferences that use it and gives confidence of the quality
that the conferences uphold. In this paper, we analyze the security of the
Web-Submission-and-Review (WSaR) software - latest version 0.53 beta
at the time of writing; developed by Shai Halevi from IBM Research.
WSaR is currently in use by top cryptology and security-related con-
ferences including Eurocrypt 2007 & 2008, Crypto 2007, and Asiacrypt
2007, annually sponsored by the International Association for Crypto-
logic Research (IACR). We present detailed analysis on WSaR’s security
features. In particular, we first discuss the desirable security features that
are designed into WSaR and what attacks these features defend against.
Then, we discuss how some untreated security issues may lead to prob-
lems, and we show how to enhance WSaR security features to take these
issues into consideration. Our results are the first known careful analysis
of WSaR, or any type of online submission system for that matter.
Keywords: Web submission and review software, security analysis, privacy,
passwords, email, protocol.
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1 Introduction
About two decades ago, authors interested to submit papers to a conference
would submit via postal service or airmail. After being reviewed, papers (together
with the reviews) would be sent back by similar means. Before the camera-ready
deadline, authors of accepted papers would need to race against time to send
their camera-ready versions over, and hope that they do not get lost in transit.
This method of correspondence is not only costly, it is also time-consuming.
More notably, it will be hard to trace lost or delayed papers and reviews since
it all depends on the reliability of the postal system. Fast forward a few years,
technology advances introduce the use of email (attachments) and facsimile.
Although most email services are free of charge, this method is often limited
in terms of the size of the attachment(s). Facsimile, on the other hand, can be
costly although fast.
Thus, the introduction of online web-based systems significantly facilitates
the paper submission and review process [26], and overcomes shortfalls in the
traditional paper-based system. Authors and reviewers can track their papers’
progress anytime, anywhere, as long as they have an Internet connection. In
addition, the conference Chair is now capable of managing papers and reviews
more effectively, as well as reacting quickly to feedback and complaints.
According to a survey [26] by ALPSP4 on web submission and review systems
for journals, among the 442 respondents selected at random from the ISI Web
of Knowledge database, 81 per cent preferred to use web submission and review
systems and 36 per cent said that they would think twice when choosing a
journal without online submission for their work. Following the introduction of
online submission, there was a 25 per cent increase in submission volumes and
publishers reported a 30 per cent decrease in administration time. From this
survey, we see that online submission and review systems are playing a significant
role. Nevertheless, popular though they be, there is still an issue involved that
should be a major concern among the community - how secure are the data
handled by these systems?
In this setting, security and privacy can be seen from two opposite perspec-
tives. One, arguably less eminent, is the risk of malicious individuals attempting
to obtain unauhorized access to leading edge research results and thus idea theft,
or cause unfair dismissal of submitted papers. On the other is the case of honest
paper authors desiring that the submission system maintains their privacy and
secrecy of research ideas, and be able to verify to themselves and prove later to
others that their submissions are properly handled by the system; at least that
any errors should be detectable without unnecessary delay. Also desirable to the
honest reviewer is that reviewer anonymity is upheld.
In this paper, we analyze the web-submission-and-review system (known as
WSaR from here onwards) [10] developed by Shai Halevi from IBM Research.
WSaR is currently in use by top cryptology conferences including Eurocrypt
2007 & 2008, Crypto 2007 and Asiacrypt 2007, annually sponsored by the Inter-
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national Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR) [11]. See Appendix B for
a longer list.
2 WSaR and its Security Features
WSaR is open source and is hosted at SourceForge [23]. While analyzing its
HyperText Preprocessor (PHP) scripts, we found some security features that
have been designed into WSaR to protect against several common Web attacks.
This section will analyze how the features are added and the type of attacks the
features defend against.
2.1 Password Strength
Passwords are often the first defense against intrusion. Relative to online submis-
sion and review systems, passwords are the first fortification to ensure the quality
of conference proceedings because they are used to safeguard the submissions
and their reviews.
In order to gain initial access to the administration or review sites, WSaR
computes and generates unique passwords for the conference Chair and reviewers
respectively. Firstly, after the customization phase, the Chair will be given a
10-alphanumeric-character password to log in to the administration site. Once
logged in, he has the option to change the default password.
The same goes to the reviewers (in most security conferences, a reviewer
with access to the online system is called a program committee member) - soon
after the Chair grants the reviewers access to the review site, they will receive
a notification email that gives them the password to log on to their own review
sites. Here, they will be able to view the list of submissions (for which they have
no conflict of interest), change their reviewing preferences, post their reviews,
participate in paper discussions or take part in a ballot. On the other hand,
throughout the submission phase, a distinct submission-ID and password will be
generated for every paper. Authors will need these parameters to revise or with-
draw the papers. However, they do not have the option to change the submission
password.
These “WSaR-generated” passwords are 10-alphanumeric-character strings.
Each character is either uppercase (A-Z), lowercase (a-z), numerals (0-9), or
sometimes a tilde (˜) or an underscore ( ). Figure 1 illustrates how passwords
are generated in WSaR:
1. For the Chair and PC members: A long random string is generated using
PHP functions such as uniqid(), mt_rand(), and rand(). This random
string has length between 15 to 28 digits.
For the submissions: A long random string is generated using the similar
functions as above. This string is then appended by the submission’s title
and the author’s name.










32 hexadecimal-character string 
10753459c7300b71b5838899114 







Fig. 1. Password generation process for the reviewer
3. The first 16 hexadecimal digits of the resulted message digest are extracted.
4. A customWSaR encoding function is used to compress these extracted digits
into a 10-digit alphanumeric string.
5. The resulting string (which is the password) will be emailed to the user (see
Figure 2).
 
Fig. 2. An example email where generated password is emailed to the conference Chair
Note that an alphanumeric character corresponds to 6-bit entropy, so the
entire 10-alphanumeric-character string requires an exhaustive effort of 260 to
brute force. Therefore, the passwords generated by WSaR are deemed to be
secure.
2.2 Password Storage for Conference Chair and PC Members
No matter where passwords are stored on the online system server, they should
be stored in encrypted or hashed form, similar to multi-user operating systems
like Unix, Linux etc. The most popular way to seal passwords in a database is via
password hashing. There are currently two most commonly used hash functions,
namely the Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) and the Message Digest 5 (MD5).
MD5 produces a hash that is 128 bits long (equivalent to 32 hexadecimal
characters) while SHA-1 computes a hash that is 160 bits long (equivalent to
40 hexadecimal characters). Among these two, MD5 is the more commonly used
hash function to safeguard passwords as well as to ensure message or software
integrity. Likewise, this function is also employed in WSaR when it comes to
storing passwords.
Here, we look at how WSaR protects the Chair and PC members’ passwords
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Fig. 3. Generation of salt string and password storing process
1. Upon customization, a random string is generated using PHP functions such
as uniqid(), mt_rand(), and rand(). The string’s message digest is com-
puted and the digest is then compressed using a custom WSaR function
into a 22-alphanumeric-character salt string. This salt string is saved and is
constant throughout the entire conference.
2. The user’s email address and password are retrieved.
3. The salt string is then appended by the user’s email address and password,
and it is fed to the MD5 hash function.
4. The resulting digest is stored into the database table (see Figure 4).
 
 
Fig. 4. The digests are stored in the database instead of the passwords
In this case, users’ passwords are not stored in the clear in the database,
and it is infeasible for an attacker to reverse on the hash values to retrieve the
pre-images (passwords). In Section 3.5, we will discuss an issue with the storage
of submissions’ passwords.
Furthermore, this technique of appending a salt string to the email address
and password before hashing it increases the difficulty in cracking the passwords
using brute-force attack even if an attacker has access to the hash table. In
Section 3.4, we discuss how using different salt strings (instead of a constant
one) can increase the difficulty in cracking users’ passwords.
2.3 Input Sanitization
As discussed in [8], SQL injection is considered one of the most dangerous threats
to Web applications because it allows an attacker to connect to the back-end
database and extract any data as he wants. An example of an SQL injection
attack is the log in form where a user enters his username and password to be
authorized, and the server will retrieve the user’s ID and credit card number,
for example. Generally, the SQL query is shown in Table 1:
Table 1. SQL statement to retrieve user’s ID and credit card number
SELECT ID, CREDIT_NUM 
FROM  users 
WHERE username = ‘$username’ 
AND password = ‘$password’ 
 
Assuming an attacker enters “Jane” in the username field and provides the
string “anything’ OR ‘a’=‘a” in the password field. The SQL query would be-
come:
Table 2. SQL statement as “modified” by the attacker
SELECT ID, CREDIT_NUM 
FROM  users 
WHERE username = ‘Jane’ 
AND password = ‘anything’ OR ‘a’=‘a’ 
 
The ‘a’=‘a’ part is always true regardless of what the first part of the
query contains, thus the attacker would be able to trick the application to obtain
database data that is not supposed to be returned by the application. Success-
ful SQL injection attack will also result in authentication bypass and database
modification [15].
The “one rule” to defend against SQL injection (as well as cross-site scripting,
buffer overflows etc.) is input sanitization. If this is done, the Web application
will be 80 per cent more secure.
There are two commonly used ways to validate input: (1) strip off any undesir-
able characters (such as meta-characters) and (2) check input data for expected
data type [12]. Both ways are implemented in WSaR. We note that the po-
tential SQL injection characters include: (”*;&<>/’ˆ) [7]. In WSaR, a possible
exploitation of special characters for an SQL Injection attack is in the “Submis-
sion/Revision Receipt” page where, as an example, the receipt page’s URL for
submission A with password ‘ABC’ will be “http://localhost/receipt.php?
subId=A&subPwd=ABC”. In this case, query to the database will be as in Table 3
(as an example).
Table 3. SQL statement to retrieve submission with subId=A and subPwd=ABC





Firstly, WSaR uses the my_addslashes() function in PHP to remove un-
desirable characters. If an attacker happens to be one of the submitters to the
conference, she would know the pattern of the receipt page’s URL. Now, she
is interested in finding out the paper submitted by her rival, so she launches
an SQL Injection attack on the receipt page by changing the URL to “http:
//localhost/receipt.php?subId=1&subPwd=1’%20OR%20‘1’=‘1”, where %20
represents a space in its HTML entity. This time, the query will be as follows:
Table 4. SQL query for an SQL Injection attack
SELECT  title, authors, abstract 
FROM submissions 
WHERE subId=‘1’ 
AND subPwd=‘1’ OR ‘1’=‘1’ 
 
However, since all special characters are removed by the my_addslashes()
function - single quotes are ignored using backslashes (commented out), the
‘1’=‘1’ part no longer makes sense. Thus, the attacker will receive a generic
error message as shown in the screen shot in Figure 5.
 
 
Fig. 5. Attacker receives an error message
If the software does not sanitize user’s input in all PHP scripts (i.e. all
my_addslashes() functions are removed from every WSaR scripts), the URL
constructed by the attacker will return submission 1’s receipt page and from
there, she can redirect to the revision page and revise her rival’s paper or even
withdraw it from the conference without her rival knowing it (see Figure 6).
Secondly, developers should specify the type of input that is expected for
certain form fields, and that the unexpected input will be removed. As an ex-
ample, a form field that requests for user’s phone number should accept only
numbers as input. WSaR always has a specific input type that is expected for
the submission ID - it processes only integers for the submission ID field. In spite
 Fig. 6. An attacker can click on the Revision or Withdrawal link to revise or withdraw
the submission
of that, developers can make use of regular expressions to tell the program the
type of pattern in the text that it should look for [19]. If the data submitted
does not match the regular expression, it will be ignored [7] or error messages
will be generated.
Both the above mentioned methods are employed in WSaR. Therefore, this
system is not categorized as one of the 60 per cent of Web applications that is
vulnerable to SQL injection (or other attacks due to invalidated input) [24].
2.4 Resistance to Bypass of Access Control Checks through Forced
Browsing
Forced browsing refers to a technique used by attackers to access to resources
that are not referenced, but are nevertheless accessible [25]. Access control checks
are normally performed after a user gets authenticated and it monitors what
authorized users are allowed to do. As an example, if a reviewer is blocked from
reviewing certain submissions due to conflict of interest, he should not be able to
bypass the access control checks by requesting the review form of that submission
directly in the URL.
Taking a look at the URL of a review form; to review submission A, reviewer
will access the review form at the URL “http://localhost/review/review.
php?subId=A” (see Figure 7).
Assume that the insider attacker is one of the reviewers in a conference and
she is blocked from reviewing submission 1 since she is one of the authors of
that submission. In order to make sure that her submission is accepted to the
conference, the attacker needs good reviews for her paper. Thus, she tries to





Fig. 7. Review form for submission 1
review.php?subId=1” since she is prohibited to access the link directly from
her review page. If the system then displays the review form for submission 1,
the attacker has bypassed the access control checks through forced browsing.
Fortunately, the attempt to bypass WSaR’s access control check is forbidden
in the review form page, as well as the voting page and the reviewers’ discus-
sion forum. Whenever a reviewer attempts to access a blocked submission by
directly specifying the submission-ID in the URL, WSaR will firstly perform an
authorization check in the reviewer table; if the reviewer is blocked from that
submission, it will display an error message indicating that the submission is not





Fig. 8. WSaR prevents broken access control
3 Security Issues and Enhancements
In addition to the security features already designed into WSaR discussed in
Section 2, we have also discovered some security issues not treated in WSaR
and in this section, we discuss them in detail and then describe ways to enhance
WSaR security by taking them into consideration.
For any security issue, we will discuss its implications from the two opposing
perspectives motivated in Section 1. We also highlight whether exploitation of
issues can be traceable or uniquely pointing the finger to the culprit. This has
devastating consequences if the attacker cannot be traced since it means even
a curious (if not malicious) researcher from the scientific community could have
mounted the attack without any counter-incentives i.e. no adverse effects on his
reputation. Furthermore, issues that lead to attacks for which the culprit cannot
be unambiguously accused will cause disputes for which a malicious attacker
could deny his involvement or an honest user be unfairly thought by peers to
have mounted an attack.
3.1 Browser Caching
Browser caching is categorized as one of the critical areas in OWASP’s Top Ten
projects under “Broken Authentication and Session Management” [25].
In WSaR, the submission-ID and password are sent by the HTTP GETmethod.
Information sent in such way will be displayed in the browser’s URL [18] and it





Fig. 9. Submission-ID and password are displayed in the page’s URL
This means the submission-ID and password are part of the URL. As has
been highlighted in [25], authentication and session data should not be submitted
as part of a GET to prevent someone malicious from using the “Back” button in
an authorized user’s browser to backup the page and hence obtain the password
from the URL.
Alternatively, even if a browser window is closed, the URL info can also be
obtained from the browser’s cache and history. Recall that browsers cache most
of the contents of frequently visited pages so that the pages will load faster the
next time they are visited, including images, sounds, cookies, web pages and their
URLs. Information stored in browsers’ cache is not encrypted [1] and it can be
obtained by anyone who accesses the computer. Both Netscape Navigator and
Mozilla Firefox, by default require users to clear the browser’s cache (and disk
cache - also known as “Temporary Internet Files”) manually. On the other hand,
Internet Explorer will clear the browser’s cache but not the “Temporary Internet
Files”, once the browser is restarted. In addition, previously visited URLs are
typically stored in the browser’s history; for instance the latest versions (at the
time of writing) of Netscape Navigator and Mozilla Firefox by default will only
clear browser’s history every nine days, while the default for Internet Explorer
is 20 days.
Figure 10 shows the receipt URLs stored in the “Temporary Internet Files”
folder. In spite of that, if the user does not clear the browser’s cache or history
after he uses the computer, the URLs will also be displayed in the browser’s









Fig. 11. Submission ID and password are exposed to the attacker
This threat can be launched by any individual having access to a common
machine previously utilized by a WSaR user, and upon retrieving the login in-
formation (ID and password), he can login as the WSaR victimized user. This
attack is non-traceable in the sense that the attacker cannot be later pinpointed,
so he can mount the attack without any risk of jeopardizing his reputation. Thus,
the counter-incentive is non-existent that it will indeed be tempting for any in-
dividual to abuse this issue to the victim’s disadvantage.
Browser caching can be prevented by submitting the submission-ID and pass-
word as part of a HTTP POST method [25] instead. If the POST method is used,
we can employ the PHP’s predefined variable “$_POST” to retrieve the values
entered in the submission-ID and password fields respectively. In this case, both
submission-ID and password will not be displayed in the page’s URL.
Other than this, WSaR users are advised to clear the browser’s cache before
they leave the computer. In Netscape Navigator, users would have to clear both
the memory and disk cache; in Mozilla Firefox, users should check all fields when
clearing their private data [4]; in Internet Explorer, users should clear the history
and all temporary internet files [21]. This way, users can ensure the security of
their private information.
3.2 Constant Salt String for Reviewer and Chair Passwords
In Section 2.2, we discussed how WSaR uses a salt string appended to the re-
viewer’s email address and password to build a stronger defense in securing his
passwords. However, this salt string is constant throughout the entire confer-
ence for any party, thus all users of the same conference will have the same
salt appended to their password. So what differentiates each user is just the
email address (which is typically public information) and his password. This in-
dicates that the salt string does not really provide better strength against insider
attackers (users of the same conference) than conventional password-based au-
thentication systems. Therefore, we recommend the use of different salt strings
for different users.
These salt strings will be stored in a single PHP script upon customization
of WSaR, and they will be labeled in the sense that “SALT_2” will be used for
PC member with the ID of 2 and so on. In this case, since the salt strings will
be random and of different lengths, the attacker would have a much harder time
trying to guess the exact salt that is appended to a specific user’s email address
and password.
Again, this threat is non-traceable as it allows a malicious insider individual
to brute-force the password, upon which he can login as the victim without any
evidence pointing back to him.
3.3 Storage of Submission Passwords
Throughout our analysis, we discovered that although WSaR stores the hashes
of reviewers’ passwords, it does not do the same when it comes to storing sub-
missions’ passwords (see Figure 12). For someone who manages to gain access
to the database, he has the ID and password for every submission as well. We
recommend that the submission passwords to be salted and hashed as well to
secure them so that even if a hacker manages to penetrate the database’s secu-
rity, he would face the prospect of a potentially expensive search for the exact
password.
 
Fig. 12. Submissions’ passwords are stored in the clear in the database
3.4 Password Policy and Strength Checking
Using a good password by every user is vital to defending a system. The com-
ponents of a good password should be at least eight characters long, should not
consist of dictionary words (would be vulnerable to dictionary attack otherwise),
should never be the same as the user’s log in name, should not consist of any item
that is easily identified with the user, and have at least three of the following
elements [5]:
– One or more uppercase letters (A-Z)
– One or more lowercase letters (a-z)
– One or more numerals (0-9)
– One or more special characters or punctuation marks
However, it is worth noting that some systems do not permit the use of certain
special characters in user’s password string.
Although the passwords supplied by WSaR fulfill all the mentioned require-
ments, users might find the password hard to remember and opt to change it.
Therefore, we analysed WSaR’s password change mechanism. WSaR does not
have any password policies imposed to ensure the strength of new passwords,
thus a careless user may happen to employ a password which is easily cracked
by any password-cracking tools, without being reminded not to do so. Hence,
we suggest that WSaR should force its users to adopt passwords that cannot
be easily cracked. Google mail [9] uses a scale to show its users the strength of
their passwords with parameters such as “Too short”, “Weak”, “Fair”, “Good”





Fig. 13. Google mail’s password strength evaluation
However, careless users tend to ignore the password strength evaluation and
proceed to employing the new password. Consequently, the system’s security
could still be breached.
Having said that, WSaR’s password changing mechanism should perform an
assessment on the new password - whether it is too short or it contains dictionary
words or even a row of letters from a standard keyboard layout (e.g., ertyui) [14].
If a user’s new password happens to be a weak password, a pop up window should
be issued to require him to re-enter a new password.
Besides that, a password policy should also be implemented to require fre-
quent change of passwords. If an attacker uses brute-force attack to crack a
password, it is possible that he would be taking a long time (depending on the
length of the password, speed of both the machine and network connection) to
complete the attack [14]. In this case, if the user changes his password frequently,
he could avoid his password from being cracked via brute-force attack.
3.5 Absence of File Integrity and Binding
Whenever we download any files or software, the first thing we would want to do
is to check the file’s integrity. Presently, the most popular method used to verify
a file’s integrity is via the use of the MD5 function. If the file content is modified,
it can be easily detected by re-computing its hash value. In an online submission
and review system, calculating a submission’s message digest is important both
to ensure message integrity and to bind the author to the submitted paper due
to absence of face-to-face communication.
We note that WSaR does not have this feature, i.e. upon submission the file’s
message digest is not computed and thus not supplied to both the author and the
Chair. Therefore, considering the case of malicious users, if an author happens to
submit a not-so-perfect paper in order to meet the submission deadline, he can
later deny that he submitted that version of the paper, then claim that the file
is corrupted and request for a second-time submission, thus gaining advantage
over other authors. More devastatingly, an honest author could have submitted
a proper paper but the file became corrupted by the server machine; in which
case it is desirable to be able to unambiguously prove that the corrupted version
is not the submitted file, or at least be able to check during submission that it
was properly received. This avoids ambiguity when a Chair notes during review
phase that a file is corrupted and is unsure if it was intentionally submitted
in that form in order to buy authors some time, or if it was indeed submitted
properly but was corrupted in transit.
Indeed, this issue is often not so much to guard against malicious authors
but rather so as to allow a scientifically honest author in this situation to be
able to prove his innocence beyond any doubt.
To counter this issue, we recommend that authors be presented with a 128-
bit hash of his submission file and that this hash value is kept as a record for
the Chair. Since WSaR is developed in PHP, we can apply the “md5_file()”
function where it calculates the message digest of the given file [18].
Firstly, a new column has to be created in the “submissions” table to record
the message digest by adding a “msgDigest varchar(255) BINARY NOT NULL”
statement in the “create_table( )” function, which can be found in WSaR’s
database.php script. Subsequently, we added a statement to calculate the file’s
message digest in the act-submit.php and act-revise.php scripts, which are
used in WSaR to process all parameters entered in the submission and revision
form respectively. The resulted digest is inserted into the database under the
“msgDigest” column and authors will be redirected to the receipt page. An
email will also be generated to the author, and carbon-copied to the Chair with
all submission details listed (including the message digest). Now, we can be
assured of the file’s integrity as well as binding the author to his submission.
The screenshots are shown as Figure 14 and Figure 15 in Appendix A for further
illustration.
4 Protocol Sketch for Password Distribution via Email
In general (not specific to WSaR), passwords for reviewers are commonly sent
via emails to the reviewers’ email addresses. This is indeed the most practical
way to distribute passwords, although it is known that email formats by default
(and this is the setting that users commonly use) do not provide any form of
confidentiality nor authenticity, unless explicit email clients or plug-ins like PGP
are applied.
We take what we view as a concrete step towards securing online systems by
motivating here and sketching the basic idea of our ongoing work: a proposal for
an email-based password distribution protocol for security conferences. Having
this kind of protocol in place will prevent reviewer passwords from being easily
compromised through attacks mounted not on the system itself but on how this
password is distributed. Indeed, it is well known that the study of password-
based key exchange protocols is a long-standing research topic in cryptology,
thus we should avoid having security conferences using in practice the email-
based password distribution protocols that are not securely designed.
The setting for an email ID-based password distribution protocol is differ-
ent from those in typical key exchange protocols [3]. The protocol involves two
parties, the program chair C and the reviewer R. Rather than requiring any
public-key infrastructure (PKI), only a trusted web site bulletin board is used,
for instance the IACR website (http://www.iacr.org), where URLs for differ-
ent IACR conferences or workshops are hosted or mirrored. On this website is
listed the email address IDC of the program chair. Meanwhile, it is common that
the chair invites program committee members (the reviewers) who are experts
in the field and for whom the chair knows the authentic email addresses IDR
either himself, or for which he can ask from other experts through some out of
band mechanism. Alternatively, the email addresses can be obtained from the
IACR membership database.
Thus, when a reviewer R receives an email from the chair C, it can check
to be certain that the email came from the chair; vice versa a chair knows if
an email came from a particular reviewer. This provides source authentication
without resorting to any PKI.
Then a general sketch of this kind of protocol proceeds as follows:
1. C generates an ID-based public and private key pair based on his IDC . De-
note these as pkC and skC . Then C computes the message sigSKC(IDC , IDR,Invite)
where sigSK denotes signing under a person’s private key SK, and Invite
contains a one-way (e.g. hashed) representation of a typical invitation email
stating the conference name etc.
2. C sends m1 = sigSKC (IDC , IDR, Invite) to R.
3. R generates an ID-based public and private key pair based on his IDR. De-
note these as pkR and skR. ThenR computes the message sigSKR(IDR, IDC ,Accept).
4. R sends m2 = sigSKR(IDR, IDC ,Accept) to C.
5. C generates a password pwdR for R.
6. C sendsm3 = 〈sigSKC(IDC , IDR, m1, m2, EncPKR(pwdR)), EncPKR(pwdR)〉
to R, where EncPK(·) denotes encryption under a person’s public key PK.
7. R obtains pwdR by decrypting EncPKR(pwdR).
In fact, this can be a concrete step to a long-term setting where one submission
and review system is used for all conferences that use WSaR, so only a one-
time setup cost e.g. the ID-based password distribution protocol as above, is
incurred for new users, while existing users can update their passwords online
through the system at any time; and new membership in conference program
committees of existing users only require the program chair to email to a PC
member R asking him to update his password himself rather than having to email
newly generated passwords every time R is involved in a new conference program
commitee. Indeed, this centralization is possible since conferences using WSaR
are typically hosted on a central machine e.g. at http://s1.iacr.org, unlike
some other submission software that need to be locally set up. Furthermore,
conferences using WSaR commonly involve program committee members who
are involved in multiple conferences so the setup cost will be amortized over
time and this centralization makes sense compared to treating each conference
system separately.
We emphasize here that the above is a sketch of a protocol design that we are
currently working on, whose formal security we are in the process of proving. This
should therefore preclude the sprouting of future papers that propose informal
“breaks” on the above enumerated steps. The above sketch should only be taken
as a basic template and taken for the general idea that it is sketching and nothing
more. We do welcome comments for which will be acknowledged in future work,
or collaborations in this direction.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have seen that WSaR is built with a strong defense against a
number of known attacks in the Web. We have also discovered and discussed the
absence of several features that could jeopardise the security of WSaR users and
we proposed suggestions to further enhance WSaR’s security that address these
issues. As a side remark, we recommend that besides strengthening the defense of
the software itself e.g. WSaR, Web administrators should secure the Web server
as well as the back-end database and constantly monitor the activities going on
in the Web server to detect any malicious behaviour.
In addition, as a further step to securing these types of systems, we have
also motivated the design of an email-based password distribution protocol for
WSaR users and argued that together with such a design, there are advantages
in centralizing conferences that use WSaR.
References
1. AICT Security - Empty your Cache. Available online at https://www.ualberta.
ca/AICT/Security/BrowserCache.html#private
2. Archer, T. Are Hash Codes Unique?. Available online at http://blogs.msdn.
com/tomarcher/archive/2006/05/10/594204.aspx
3. Bellare, M., and Rogaway, P. Entity Authentication and Key Distribution. Ad-
vances in Cryptology - CRYPTO ’93, LNCS, Vol. 773, pp. 232-249, 1993
4. CIBC - Clear Your Browser’s Cache. Available online at http://www.cibc.com/
ca/legal/clear-browsers-cache.html
5. Conklin, W.A., White, G.B., Cothren, C., Williams, D., and Davis, R.L. Principles
of Computer Security: Security+ TM and Beyond. McGraw-Hill, 2005.
6. EasyChair Conference System. Available online at http://www.easychair.org/
7. Foster, J.C. Defense Tactics for SQL Injection Attacks. Available
online at http://searchappsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/0,289483,sid92
gci1219912,00.html
8. Fyre, C. One Simple Rule to Make your Web Apps more Secure, 2006.
Available online at http://searchappsecurity.techtarget.com/qna/0,289202,
sid92 gci1225425,00.html
9. Google Mail. Available online at http://gmail.google.com.
10. Halevi, S. Web Submission and Review Software. Available online at http://
theory.csail.mit.edu/∼shaih/websubrev
11. IACR Conferences. Available online at http://www.iacr.org/conferences/
12. McClure, S., Shah, S., and Shah, S. Web Hacking: Attacks and Defense. Addison-
Wesley, 2003.
13. Microsoft Corporation. Microsoft’s Conference Management Toolkit. Available
online at http://msrcmt.research.microsoft.com/cmt/
14. Password Cracking: Information from Answers.com, 2006. Available online at
http://www.answers.com/topic/password-cracking
15. Peikari, C., and Chuvakin, A. Security Warrior. O’Reilly, 2004.
16. Phan, R.C.-W., and Goi, B.-M. Flaw in IEEE Trans on Consumer Electronics
Online Submission System. Presented at the rump session of the International
Conference on Cryptology in Malaysia (Mycrypt ’05), 2005.
17. Phan, R.C.-W., and Ling, H.-C. On the Insecurity of the Microsoft Research
Conference Management Tool (MSRCMT) System. Proceedings of International
Conference on IT in Asia (CITA ’05), pp. 75-79, 2005. Also presented at the rump
session of Asiacrypt 2004, Jeju Island, Korea.
18. PHP Manual. Full version available online at http://www.php.net/manual/en/
19. Regular Expressions, 2006. Available online at http://searchappsecurity.
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660,sid92 gci517740,00.html
20. ScholarOne, Inc. Manuscript Central: About Manuscript Central. Available online
at http://www.scholarone.com/products manuscriptcentral aboutMC.shtml
21. Security Information: Clearing Browser Cache and History. Available online at
http://www.hlasset.com/files/Clearing Cache History.pdf
22. SoftConf.com - Software for Conferences. Available online at http://www.
softconf.com/index.html
23. SourceForge.net: Web Submission and Review Software. Available online at http:
//sourceforge.net/projects/websubrev
24. What is SQL Injection?, 2006. Available online at http://searchappsecurity.
techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,290660,sid92 gci1003024,00.html
25. The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Vulnerabilities, 2004.
Available online at http://osdn.dl.sourceforge.net/sourceforge/owasp/
OWASPTopTen2004.pdf
26. Ware, M. Online Submission and Peer-Review System, 2005. Available online at
www.zen34802.zen.co.uk/Learned Publishing offprint.pdf
Acknowledgement
The first author thanks Shai Halevi for encouragement during the initial stages
of this research, for patiently answering queries about WSaR and for detailed
comments on an early version of this paper. The second author thanks Thomas
Baigne`res for stimulating discussions on another popular submission and review
system iChair. Nous avons eu un temps merveilleux pendant la pause de cafe`,
ou bien? We thank an anonymous referee for motivational comments especially
on the need to make clear the distinction between pro- and counter-incentives
for an attacker; and for acknowledging the fun of this research work :-)
A Storage and Display of Submissions’ Digests
We present below the screen shots of the “submissions” table, and the submis-
sion/revision receipt after the calculation of submission’s digest is incorporated.
 
Fig. 14. Digest of submission is stored in the database for Chair’s reference
  
Fig. 15. Digest of submission is presented in the receipt for the author
B Conferences that have Used or are Using WSaR
In reverse chronological order:
1. EUROCRYPT 2008: 27th Annual International Conference on the Theory
and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
2. CT-RSA 2008: RSA Conference 2007, Cryptographers’ Track
3. LATIN 2008: 8th Latin American Theoretical Informatics
4. TCC 2008: 5th Theory of Cryptography Conference
5. PKC 2008: 11th International Conference on Theory and Practice in Public-
Key Cryptography
6. ASIACRYPT 2007: 13th Annual International Conference on the Theory
and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
7. ISC 2007: 10th Information Security Conference
8. CRYPTO 2007: 27th Annual International Cryptology Conference
9. ICALP 2007: Track C of the 34th International Colloquium on Automata,
Languages and Programming
10. GOCP 2007: 1st International Workshop on Group-Oriented Cryptographic
Protocols
11. ACNS 2007: 5th International Conference on Applied Cryptography and
Network Security
12. EUROCRYPT 2007: 26th Annual International Conference on the Theory
and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
13. USEC 2007: Usable Security Workshop
14. TCC 2007: 4th Theory of Cryptography Conference
15. CT-RSA 2007: RSA Conference 2007, Cryptographers’ Track
16. HVC 2006: 2nd Annual Haifa Verification Conference
17. PKC 2006: 9th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Public-
Key Cryptography
C Related Work
Many online paper submission and review systems are emerging. For the con-
text of cryptology and information security, the predecessor to WSaR is the
collection of PHP/Perl scripts written progressively by Chanathip Namprem-
pre, Andre Adelsbach, Andrew Clark and the Computer Security and Industrial
Cryptography (COSIC) group at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
These scripts were used for almost all mainstream cryptology and informa-
tion security conferences till 2006 when building on ideas in these scripts, two
successor systems were developed independently: WSaR by Shai Halevi of IBM
Research and iChair by Thomas Baigne`res and Matthieu Finiasz of LASEC at
EPFL. These two systems are now used by almost all mainstream cryptology
and information security conferences.
A few other major submission and review systems used in other fields deserve
some mention here:
1. Manuscript Central
Manuscript Central [20], developed by ScholarOne, Inc., is the online sub-
mission and peer review system used to handle manuscript submissions to
journals. It manages over 44,000 submissions per month and its compre-
hensive and user-friendly features result in reports that most journals us-
ing Manuscript Central achieve gains in submissions of 20 to 40 per cent
per annum. This system is currently used by most IEEE and Association
of Computing Machinery (ACM) journals. Manuscript Central is a fully-
developed software with 24-hour support on weekdays. By contacting the
sales representative, one would be able to obtain and understand the sys-
tem’s functionalities, features, pricing and get the system running in two
weeks’ time.
2. Microsoft Research Conference Management Tool (MSRCMT)
Firstly developed for ACM SIGKDD 1999, the MSRCMT [13] is an academic
conference management service sponsored by Microsoft Research. Surajit
Chaudhuri, a Research Area Manager at Microsoft Research is the architect
of MSRCMT. Since the year 1999, this system has been used in over 500
conferences, among them are the International Conference on Security of
Information and Networks (SIN 2007) and the ACM SIGCOMM 2007 Data
Communication Festival. Similar to Manuscript Central, the MSRCMT is
also a fully-developed system. It is free and hosted by Microsoft Research,
but with limited support since it is developed and managed by a small team.
3. EasyChair
Developed in the year 2002 by Andrei Voronkov, a Professor from the Univer-
sity of Manchester, EasyChair [6] is used by over 600 conferences in year 2007
alone. EasyChair is free and it is currently hosted by University of Manch-
ester’s Computer Science Department. EasyChair is capable of supporting
two models: (1) the standard model for conferences having one program com-
mittee and (2) the multi-track version for conferences having multiple tracks
that have their own program committee. There are a number of ACM and
IEEE conferences/workshops that have used or are using EasyChair. Among
them are the 8th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Grid Comput-
ing (Grid 2007), the 2nd ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted Computing
(STC’07) and the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundation Symposium
(CSF 20).
4. START V2 ConferenceManager
START V2 [22], written by Rich Gerber, is a product from SoftConf.com.
Apart from EasyChair, several IEEE and ACM conferences have, or are
employing START V2 as the submission and peer review system since the
year 2002. The IEEE Symposium on Intelligence and Security Informatics
(ISI 2007), the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, the 5th
ACM Workshop on Recurring Malcode (WORM 2007) and the 40th Annual
IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO 2007)
are among the many IEEE and ACM conferences using START V2. Users
would need to contact the developer to order the system; the pricing de-
pends on whether one needs the system to be hosted at softconf.com, and
on the different types of licensing arrangements. This system is constantly
improving based on the users’ feedback.
It is worth to note two earlier work related to the security of online submission
and review systems, although our work here is the first detailed analysis of this
type of system. Phan and Goi [16] pointed out the lack of privacy in a system
used by an IEEE Transactions where the URL of pages that disclose paper
information and that allow paper revision for a particular submitted paper,
differ from pages of other papers by an ID counter. Thus if the URL to revise
author A’s submitted paper is uniquely identified by ID 100, then A can also
view the revision page for the paper submitted right after (resp. before) his,
which he knows will be uniquely identified by ID 101 (resp. 99). Correspondence
with the administrator of the system obtained the response that this was not a
significant issue.
Phan and Ling [17] discovered by accident when submitting their paper to
a conference using the Microsoft Research Conference Management Tool (MSR-
CMT) that the system automatically creates an account for co-authors of a
corresponding author who submitted a paper, where email addresses of these
co-authors are used as login usernames and the numeric 0 is used as the de-
fault password. This applied for any co-author(s) of any paper. Correspondence
with developers of MSRCMT obtained the response that this was an exercise of
regression testing, though the flaw was present for some months in the actual
online system used by several conferences. As of 2005 it was verified that both
the above systems no longer exhibit those issues.
